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IV

Respondent, County Board of Equalization of Salt Lake County (County) respectfully
submits the following brief in response to the brief of the Petitioner, Action TV (Action).
JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the petition for judicial review filed by
Action pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-14 and 16(1) (1997) and § 78-2-2(3)(e)(ii)
(1996).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION AND STATUTES
Article XIII, section 2, part (1), Utah Const.
All tangible property in the state, not exempt under the laws of
the United States, or under this Constitution, shall be taxed at a
uniform and equal rate in proportion to its value, to be
ascertained as provided by law.
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102 (1996 & Supp. 1998)
(8)(a) "Escaped property" means any property, whether
personal, land, or any improvements to the property, subject to
taxation and is:
(i) inadvertently omitted from the tax rolls,
assigned to the incorrect parcel, or assessed to the
wrong taxpayer by the assessing authority;
(ii) undervalued or omitted from the tax rolls
because of the failure of the taxpayer to comply
with the reporting requirements of this chapter; or
(iii) undervalued because of errors made by the
assessing authority based upon incomplete or
erroneous information furnished by the taxpayer.

1

Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-103(1) (1996):
All tangible taxable property shall be assessed and taxed at a
uniform and equal rate on the basis of its fair market value, as
valued on January 1, unless otherwise provided by law.
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-306 (1996)
(1) The county assessor may request a signed statement in
affidavit form from any person setting forth all the real and
personal property assessable by the assessor which is owned,
possessed, managed, or under the control of the person at 12
o'clock noon on January 1. This statement shall be filed within
30 days after requested by the assessor.
(2) The affidavit shall include the following:
(a) all property belonging to, claimed by, or in
the possession, control, or management of the
person, any firm of which the person is a member,
or any corporation of which the person is
president, secretary, cashier, or managing agent;
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-309(1) (1996)
Any escaped property may be assessed by the original assessing
authority at any time as far back as five years prior to the time
of discovery, in which case the assessor shall enter the
assessments on the tax rolls and follow the procedures
established under Part 13 of this chapter.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On or before March 16,1994, the County Assessor' s office audited the records

of Action's three business locations. The audit revealed that Action did not report on its
personal property affidavits any of the property which was subject to rental contracts ("rentto-own") from any of its stores for any of the years at issue. R. at 935-7, 940; Exhibits R-1,
2,3.
2

2.

This rental property consisted primarily of electronic equipment, furniture and

appliances. R. at 6.
3.
assessment.

An audit was completed for each store for each year subject to the escaped
The audit identifies property by type, such as rental equipment, and a

corresponding code number. The code for rental equipment is 260. R. at 935; Exhibits R-l,
2,3.
4.

The total property tax due as a result of the audit of each store and year subject

to the escaped property assessment is $17,437.39, which represents an omission of taxable
value totaling $978,834. R. at 250; Exhibits R-l, 2, 3.
5.

The County Assessor multiplied Action's actual cost for the property by the

Tax Commission's (Commission) percent good schedule for five year class life (Class 3) to
determine the fair market value of the property. R. at 184-5, 190; Exhibits R-l, 2, 3 and 5.
6.

The five year class life represents the useful economic life of the property, and

is based on the Internal Revenue Services' (IRS) class life schedules. Transcript at 153-4,
Addendum A; Exhibits R-5.
7.

The Class 3 five year class life also accounts for the greater wear and tear

recognized for small rental equipment. R. at 871-2; Exhibit R-5.
8.

Only property subject to rent-to-own contracts was taxed; property held for sale

was exempted as inventory. R. at 938-9.

3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The evidence is undisputed that Action did not report its rental property, which was
subject to rent-to-own contracts on January 1, for the years in question. As a result nearly
a million dollars of taxable value escaped assessment. When the Assessor's office conducted
an audit of Action's business records, it discovered the omission and imposed an escaped
property assessment.
The County valued the omitted property by multiplying Action's actual cost for the
property by the percent good factor found in the Commission's Recommended Schedules for
Personal Property Valuation. The Assessor used Class 3 (five year valuation schedule),
which specifically recognizes "small rental equipment" as an example of the type of property
considered subject to the five year class life, due in part to the severe wear and tear to which
rental equipment is potentially subject.
Action's contention that the Commission's findings of fact on the issues of escaped
property and the proper percentage of depreciation which should apply, are inadequate and
not based on substantial evidence, is incorrect. The Commission made adequate findings of
fact to permit meaningful appellate review and the evidence is substantial to support the
Commission's findings of fact. Therefore, the Commission's decision should be affirmed.
Action did not submit an appraisal and therefore it has failed to meet its burden to overturn
the Board's value.

4

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COMMISSION CORRECTLY DETERMINED
THAT ACTION'S RENTAL PROPERTY IS ESCAPED
PROPERTY.
The County imposed an escaped property assessment on Action's rental equipment
property, which was subject to rental contracts on January 1 for each year, located in three
stores within the County. Exhibit R-l, 2, 3.
In the audit documents, Action's rental property is identified as code 260. Prior to the
audit, Action reported property with a total taxable value of $10,051 in 1994 for the store
located at 6602 South State Street. Action did not report any rental equipment on its personal
property affidavit. The audit revealed that Action omitted or failed to report $137,757 of
property, which was subject to rent to own contracts in 1994, rented from the State Street
location. Action omitted $137,390 in 1993; $137,920 in 1992; and, $138,980 in 1991. It
only reported between $9,988 and $12,033 in taxable personal property for the years at issue.
Exhibit R-l.
Similarly in 1994, Action omitted $178,823 in taxable value attributable to rental
equipment located at its West Valley location. Exhibit R-2. Action omitted $178,200 in
taxable value in 1993; $178,800 in 1992; $180,240 in 1991; and, $183,440 in 1990 at the
West Valley location. For those years it only reported between $3,700 and $6,450 in taxable
value. Exhibit R-2.
5

Action omitted $168,373 in taxable value in 1993 at its 250 West 2100 South location.
It omitted $168,600 of taxable value in 1992; $169,900 in 1991; $172,900 in 1990; and,
$170,650 in 1989. For those years it only reported between $15,333 and $27,900 in taxable
value. Exhibit R-3.
Action did not report the property which was subject to rental contracts because it
believed that the property was tax exempt inventory.1 Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1114 (1996
& Supp. 1998). ("Tangible personal property present in Utah on the assessment date, at
noon, held for sale in the ordinary course of business or for shipping to a final out-of-state
destination within 12 months and which constitutes the inventory of any retailer, wholesaler,
distributor, processor, warehouseman, manufacturer, producer, gatherer, transporter, storage
provider, farmer, or livestock raiser, is exempt from property taxation.")
The Commission ruled that Action's rental property, i.e. property subject to rent-toown contracts as of January 1 of the years on appeal, is not inventory and therefore is
taxable. R. at 9-10. Action did not appeal the Commission's decision denying the
exemption. Nonetheless, it contends it is entitled to the exemption because of a good faith
belief that its property is exempt.
As applied to these proceedings:

1

Mr. Thorpe: So, because you deemed your property to be inventory and nontaxable, you didn't add it to your return?
Mr. Jones: That's correct. R. at 906.
6

"Escaped property" means "any property, whether personal, land, or any
improvements to the property, subject to taxation and is:
* * *

(ii). . . omitted from the tax rolls because of the failure of the
taxpayer to comply with the reporting requirements of this
chapter."
See Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102(8)(a) (1996 & Supp. 1998).
Escaped property may be assessed at any time as far back as five years prior to the
time of discovery. Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-309 (1996). Action was required to set forth all
the "personal property assessable by the assessor which is owned, possessed, managed, or
under the control of the person at 12 o'clock noon on January 1." Utah Code Ann. § 59-2306(1). Action was required to include all of its property. Utah Code Ann. §59-2-306(2).
It is apparent from the audits that Action did not report its rental equipment (code 260)
on its personal property affidavits for any of the years subject to escaped assessment.
Exhibits R-1, 2, 3; R. at 936. The Assessor's office examined Action's personal property
affidavits and business records to verify that the rental equipment had not been reported. R.
at 937. Action confirmed that it did not report the rental property which was subject to rentto-own contracts. R. at 906. Therefore, under the definition of escaped property, as applied
to the foregoing facts, the Commission properly held that Action's rental property had
escaped assessment because Action omitted the rental property from its affidavits when it
was required to report all of its property.
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Action did not appeal that part of the Commission's decision denying the exemption,
but maintains that it was justified in not reporting the property for a variety of reasons,
including a good faith belief that the property was exempt. Appellant's Brief at 24. Tax
exemptions are only permitted if allowed under the constitution as implemented by statute.
Utah Code Ann. §59-2-309 (1996) does not recognize an exemption from an escaped
property assessment based on a good faith belief that one is entitled to an exemption. Good
faith has been recognized for avoidance of the ten percent negligence penalty for failing to
collect and remit taxes on sales, wherein the taxpayer can escape the penalty if non payment
is based on a good faith interpretation of an arguable point of law.

See Hales Sand &

Gravel. Inc. v. Audit Div.. 842 P.2d 887, 895 (Utah 1992); Broadcast Int'l Inc. v. Utah State
Tax Comm'n, 882 P.2d 691, 700-1 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). However, this has not been
recognized as an excuse for non payment of escaped property assessments and should not be
judicially adopted. Action's excuses should be rejected and the Commission's decision
affirmed.
POINT II
THE
COMMISSION'S
FINDINGS
OF
FACT
REGARDING THE COUNTY'S ESCAPED PROPERTY
ASSESSMENT ARE ADEQUATE AND SUPPORTED BY
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
A. Adequacy of the Findings of Fact.

8

Action challenges the adequacy of the Commission's finding of fact to support its
conclusion that the property is escaped property. Appellant's Brief at 43. A review of the
adequacy of the findings of fact is based on whether the agency's action is arbitrary or
capricious. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iv) (1997). This question is governed by the
court's determination of whether it "is able to conduct meaningful review." Adams v. Bd.
of Review of Indus. Comm'n, 821 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
"An administrative agency must make findings of fact and conclusions of law that are
adequately detailed so as to permit meaningful appellate review." Adams at 4. However,
an agency's failure to make adequate findings does not render its findings arbitrary and
capricious, if the "evidence is 'clear, uncontroverted and capable of only one conclusion.'"
Adams at 4-5 (citing Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987) (quoting Kinkella v.
Baugh. 660 P.2d 233,236 (Utah 1983))).2 Further, "[a] finding may be implied if it is clear
from the record, and therefore apparent upon review, that the finding was actually made as
part of the tribunal's decisions." Adams at 5.

2

Acton v. Deliran. was criticized in State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 787 n.6 (Utah
1991) because Acton suggested that only a single exception exists to preclude reversal if
the court fails to make findings on all material issues. There are several grounds
justifying upholding the lower tribunal's decision, including the one recognized in Acton.
The "clear and uncontroverted standard is "only one of several ways to avoid reversing a
trial court that fails to make findings." Ramirez at 788 n.6.
9

The Commission's conclusions of law that Action's rental property is escaped
property are based on adequate findings. The Commission made the following applicable
findings:
1)

the property at issue is personal property owned by Petitioner;

2)

the personal property was subject to rent-to-own contracts on the
respective lien dates;

3)

the property consists of furniture, appliances and electronic devices;

4)

the lessee had possession of these items on the lien date;

5)

Action did not include the property on its property tax affidavits;

6)

Action retained title to the property;

7)

the Assessor audited Action's business records and imposed an escaped
property assessment;

8)

Action is in the business of leasing, with a possibility for eventual
purchase, furniture, appliances and electronic devices;

9)

approximately 90% of Action's revenue is derived from rent-to-own
contracts.

The foregoing findings are adequate to support the Commission's conclusion and to
provide for meaningful appellate review. The evidence is clear, uncontroverted and capable
of only one conclusion. Action did not report on its personal property affidavit any of the
property it rents pursuant to its rent-to-own contracts, and has not done so for the years
10

subject to the escaped property assessment. The findings also show that the property is
owned by Action even though the property is subject to rental contracts. Action did not
appeal the Commission's decision that the property is not exempt from taxation as inventory,
thus the property is subject to taxation as required in Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102(8)(a).
Based on the foregoing, the Commission's decision is based on adequate findings.
Even if the Commission's findings are inadequate, relief should not be granted
because Action has not been substantially prejudiced. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4).
"[T]he substantial prejudice language in section 63-46b-16(4) prevents an appellate court
from granting relief if an agency error is harmless." Adams at 7 (citing Morton Int'L Inc. v.
Utah State Tax Comm'n. 814 P.2d 581, 584-585 (Utah 1991)). Error is harmless if it is
"'sufficiently inconsequential that... there is no reasonable likelihood that the error affected
the outcome of the proceedings.'" Adams at 7 (quoting Morton Int'l at 584-85). Further,
there is no substantial prejudice in failing to make adequate findings if the evidence is clear
and uncontroverted. Adams at 7. If there were errors in making adequate findings, it was
harmless and did not affect the outcome of the proceedings.
In summary, the Commission's findings of fact regarding escaped property are
adequate and have not substantially prejudiced Action. Even if the findings are not adequate,
the evidence is clear and uncontroverted that Action did not report its property on its
affidavits. The evidence leads to only one conclusion - the property is "escaped property"
and therefore the Commission's decision should be affirmed.
11

Finally, Action requests that the decision be reversed and a refund ordered because
of the inadequacy of the findings. Appellant's Brief at 43. This is not appropriate relief.
"As a general rule, the appropriate relief for an agency's failure to make adequate findings
is to vacate the order complained of and to order the agency to 'make more adequate findings
in support of, and more fully articulate [the] reasons for, the determination . . . made.'"
Adams at 8 (quoting Vali Convalescent and Care Inst, v. Div. of Health Care Financing. 797
P.2d 438, 450 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
B. Substantial Evidence to Support the Findings of Fact.
Action also contends that the findings of fact that rental property constitutes escaped
property is not supported by substantial evidence.

"[T]he party challenging the

Commission's findings must marshal all of the evidence supporting the findings and show
that despite the supporting facts, the findings are not supported by substantial evidence."
First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. County Bd. of Equalization. 799 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Utah 1990).
"Substantial evidence" "is that quantum and quality of relevant evidence that is adequate to
convince a reasonable mind to support a conclusion." Id. at 1165.
Mr. Sterling Patrick, Manager of the Personal Property Auditing Division of the
County Assessor's office, testified that Action's small rental equipment, identified by code
260 in the audit, had not been reported by Action on its personal property affidavits for any
of the years subject to the audit at any of its stores. Exhibits R-l, 2, 3; R. at 935-37, 940.
The audit information was obtained from Action's business records and personal property
12

affidavits. R. at 937. Only personal property subject to rent-to-own contracts and referred
to in Action's records as Balance on Rent (BOR), was assessed as escaped property. R. at
939. Property listed as available for sale and not subject to rental contracts was treated as
exempt inventory. R. at 938. Action confirmed that it did not report on its personal property
affidavits the property subject to rent-to-own contracts. R. at 906.
Therefore, the evidence is substantial to support the Commission's findings of fact
that the property escaped assessment. Action omitted the property from its affidavit. No
evidence in the record contradicts those findings.
In conclusion, the Commission's findings of fact are adequate, are based on
substantial evidence and the Commission's decision should be affirmed.
POINT III
THE
COMMISSION'S
FINDINGS
OF
FACT
REGARDING THE FIVE YEAR LIFE VALUATION
SCHEDULE ARE ADEQUATE AND SUPPORTED BY
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE,
A. Adequacy of the Findings of Fact.
Action challenges the adequacy of the Commission's findings of fact to support its
conclusion that the property should be depreciated using the Commission's five year class
life. R. at 9. The Commission's findings are adequate, and hence are not arbitrary or
capricious, because the court can "conduct meaningful review" of the findings and of the
conclusions of law. Adams, 821 P.2d at 4.
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The Commission's decision to use the five-year class life is based on the following
applicable findings:
1)

The property at issue is personal property;

2)

The property is owned by Action but is subject to rent-to-own
contracts;

3)

The property is primarily furniture, appliances and electronic devices;

4)

The County's assessments are based on Action's cost for the property
multiplied by the percent good tables established by the Commission
in its Recommended Schedule for Personal Property Valuation;

5)

The percent good is based on a five year class life.

6)

Action's customers intend to keep the items subject to rent to
own contracts and use them after they acquired title;

7)

Action generally disposes of the items within three years of
acquiring them either through rent to own contracts, out-right
sale or write off.

The Commission must make'" findings of fact on all necessary ultimate issues under
the governing statutory standards.'" Adams at 5 (quoting Milne Truck Lines. Inc. v. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n. 720 P.2d 1373, 1378 (Utah 1986)). The ultimate issue is the fair market
value of the property subject to rental contracts. To arrive at a determination of that issue the
Commission had to determine whether to uphold the County's use of Action's actual costs
14

for the property and whether the property should be depreciated using the Commission's
percent good schedules, which measure the economic life of the property over five years, or
as urged by Action, whether the property should be depreciated using 18-24 month straightline depreciation.
The Commission's findings of fact address all of the "necessary ultimate issues." The
Commission found that the County's assessments were based on Action's cost for the
property multiplied by the Commission's percent good schedules using a five year class life.
R. at 6. The Commission's finding, that the County's assessment was based on the five year
class life and the Commission's ultimate adoption of this finding in its conclusions of law
and decision, is based on subsidiary findings that Action disposed of the property within
three years and that the customers continued to use the property after they acquired it. R. at
7.
These subsidiary findings, as well as findings which may be implied because they are
clear from the record, reveal that the Commission found that the five year class life reflected
the most accurate measure of depreciation for the property. "A finding may be implied if it
is clear from the record, and therefore apparent upon review, that the finding was actually
made as part of the tribunal's decision." Adams at 5.
This finding may be implied because the record reflects that the 18-24 month straightline depreciation was not a measure of value but an IRS income tax depreciation method,
used to measure income and expenses to reflect book value, which is not a reflection of fair
15

market value. R. at 972. The five year class life accounts for greater wear and tear
recognized for rental property, the very reason Action believes it is entitled to a two year
depreciation schedule. R. at 971-2. Further, Action's customers contradicted its claims that
the property was frequently junked because the customers intended to keep the property and
maintained it in good condition. R. at 722, 796. Action's witnesses admitted that the 18-24
month depreciation represented the useful life of the property to the seller, not to the
customer. R. at 871-2, 911.
Based on the foregoing, the Commission's findings of fact, including the subsidiary
findings and the findings which may be implied as reflected in the record, are sufficient to
provide adequate appellate review.
B. Substantial Evidence to Support the Findings of Fact.
Action contends that the Commission's findings of fact regarding the five year
depreciation schedule are not supported by substantial evidence. "[T]he party challenging
the Commission's findings must marshal all of the evidence supporting the findings and
show that despite the supporting facts, the findings are not supported by substantial
evidence." First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 799 P.2d at 1165. "Substantial evidence" "is that
quantum and quality of relevant evidence that is adequate to convince a reasonable mind to
support a conclusion." Id.
Substantial evidence exists in the record to support the findings of fact. Mr. Denny
Lytle, the Assistant Director of the Commission's Property Tax Division (Division), testified
16

that there is a difference between the IRS' class life and the IRS' depreciation for income tax
purposes. Transcript at 153-4, Addendum A. The IRS class life represents the economic life
of the equipment, which is its useful productive life to the person using the equipment.
Transcript at 154, Addendum A. He testified that the Division relies on the IRS class life as
a basis for the Commission's schedules for percent good or depreciation. Exhibit R-5;
Transcript at 154, Addendum A.
Mr. Sterling Patrick, Manager of the Personal Property Auditing Division of the
Assessor's office, testified that the County used the recognized cost approach in appraising
Action's property when it used the Commission's schedules. R. at 955-56. Also the County
used Action's actual or wholesale cost. R. at 961. He also disputed that using Action's
recommended 18 to 24 month depreciation represented the true useful economic life of the
property. R. at 955. He testified that the Commission's class three schedule (5 year class
life) includes property subject to severe wear and tear, such as the subject rental property,
and therefore the schedule properly accounts for greater than normal depreciation. R. at 960.
Further, nearly 65% of the rent-to-own customers purchase the property. R. at 967.
Action's customers stated they maintain the property in good condition and treat it as if it
was their own. R. at 722, 796. Mr. Patrick believed that the customers' testimony was
inconsistent with Action's claims of severe wear and tear which Action used to justify the
18-24 month depreciation. Commissioner Oveson noted the inconsistency as well. R. at
967.
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Allen Tippetts, the Director of the Personal Property Division of the Assessor's office,
testified that Class 3 (five year class life) adequately accounts for depreciation for rental
equipment. R. at 970. The typical class life for refrigerators or washers and dryers owned
by businesses is 9 to 10 years. R. at 971. Therefore, the five year class life accounts for the
greater wear and tear recognized for small rental property. R. at 971-2; Exhibit R-5.
Mr. Tippetts also noted the distinction between depreciation for income tax purposes
and depreciation for valuation purposes. Depreciation applied in appraisals is a loss in value
due to all reasons.

Accounting depreciation matches costs against revenue.

The

Commission's schedules employ a percent good methodology to arrive at fair market value;
whereas depreciation for accounting purposes as used by Action is used to establish book
value, which does not equal fair market value. R. at 972.
Action's witnesses and documentary evidence support the Commission's findings as
well. Mr. Kent Thomas stated that Action's suggested 18 month straight line depreciation
for rental property is based on the average length of the contract and the economic value to
the seller, i.e. the time period it has value to be sold or rented to a customer. R. at 871. Mr.
Thomas' testimony regarding the actual or useful life of the property did not consider the
value of the useful life to the buyer. R. at 871-2. He did not know the definition of
depreciation for appraisal purposes and admitted that the straight line depreciation of 18-24
months is for accounting or IRS income tax purposes. R. at 872. Mr. Thomas admitted he
was not an appraiser and had taken no classes on appraising personal property. R. at 873.
18

Further, Mr. Thomas had previously submitted his study on depreciation, which he believed
justified the 18-24 month depreciation used by the rent-to-own industry, to the Division, but
Mr. Lytle stated that the Division found the evidence to be "inconclusive". R. at 929.
Mr. Dan Jones, the former owner of Action, testified that the average useful life of the
property to the seller is 18-24 months but he assumed that the property has greater than 18-24
months useful life to the purchaser. R. at 911.
Action also claimed that the property is often junked and therefore the 18-24 month
depreciation should be adopted. But Action's documentary evidence contradicts that
assertion. Mr. Thomas' URDA study shows that only 0.05% of the property was junked.
Exhibit P-6. Action's Inventory Tracking Report for March and April 1994 shows only
1.85% was junked. Exhibit P-4.
Further, Action did not present an appraisal of the property. Mr. Jerry Erkelen's
testimony and "appraisal" was offered solely for demonstrative purposes and not as a
valuation of the property. R. at 811. His "appraisal" was prepared over two years after the
lien date and was not directly tied to any of the specific property subject to appeal. R. at 811.
("They (sic) document which we will be entering as an Exhibit is merely prepared for
demonstrative purposes, not to the value of the particular property which is at issue in this
case.")
Based on the foregoing evidence in the record, there is substantial evidence to support
the Commission's findings of fact that justified the County's use of the Commission's
19

Recommended Schedules for Personal Property Valuation (five year class life) to depreciate
the cost of the rental property in order to arrive at fair market value.
In conclusion, the Commission findings of fact are adequate and based on substantial
evidence. The Commission's decision should be affirmed.
POINT IV

ACTION HAS FAILED TO MEET ITS BURDEN OF
PROOF TO OVERTURN THE COUNTY'S VALUATION.
The County's audit was the basis for the valuation of the escaped property. By using
Action's actual costs (wholesale) for the property subject to rental contracts and applying the
Commission's percent good tables for a five year class life, the Board arrived at the fair
market value for the subject property for each year at issue. Exhibits R-l, 2, 3; R. at 955-56,
960-61. Although Action disputed the use of the five year class life as the basis for
depreciation, it did not submit an appraisal of the subject property and therefore provided no
evidence of the fair market value of the subject property.
"In challenging the Board's valuation, Petitioner has a significant burden of proof that
he must meet." Nelson v. County Bd. of Equalization. 943 P.2d 1354, 1356 (Utah 1997).
Not only must the Petitioner show that the Commission's findings lack support, the Petitioner
"must provide an adequate basis for adopting a lower assessment." I d at 1356.
Action offered Mr. Erkelen's "appraisal" only for demonstrative purposes and not for
purposes of valuation. R. at 811. Mr. Thomas admitted he was not an appraiser and had no
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training as an appraiser. R. at 873. He did not submit an appraisal of the subject property.
In summary, Action has failed to meet its burden of proof because it hasn't shown that
the Commission's findings lack support, and it did not submit an appraisal to provide an
adequate basis for adopting a lower assessment. The Commission's decision should be
affirmed.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the County respectfully requests that the court affirm the
Commission's decision.
Respectfully submitted this /j- day of October, 1998.
OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL

MARY ELLEN SLOAN
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ADDENDUM
A
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Mr. Thorpe:
Ms. Sloan:
Judge Phan:

150

No further questions,
No further questions.
All right.

Chairman Oveson, do you

have any questions?
Chairman Oveson:

No, I shot my wad with the CPA.

Mr. Thorpe:

And he's not a CPA.

Judge Phan:

All right.

Then you may have a

seat, Mr. Jones.
Mr. Thorpe:

Mr. Jones is my final witness.

Judge Phan:

All right.

Then we'll go on to your

presentation, Ms. Sloan.
M s . Sloan:

We call on Mr. Denny Liddle at this

time.
Judge Phan:
All right.
hand?

Okay.

Is he right outside?

Okay.

Mr. Liddle, will you raise your right

Do you solemnly affirm under penalty of perjury

the testimony you are about to give is the truth, the
whole truth, and nothing but the truth?
Mr. Liddle:

Yes.

Judge Phan:

Okay, have a seat.

Judge Phan:

Ms. Sloan if you would like to sit,

you can do that, or stand, either way.
M s . Sloan:

Mr. Liddle, could you please state

your name for the record and your place of employment.
Mr. Liddle:

Denny Liddle, Utah State Tax

DEPOMAX REPORTING, LLC (801) 328-1188
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7

9 e isj

Commission, Property Tax Division.
Ms. Sloan:

And what do you do in your

occupation?
Mr. Liddle:

Assistant Director over the Property

Tax Division.
Ms. Sloan:

Are you familiar with personal

property taxation and Rent-to-Own contracts?

8

Mr. Liddle:

9

Ms. Sloan:

Yes, to some degree.
Are you familiar with the Division's

10

policy regarding the taxation of property which is

11

subject to Rent-to-Own contracts?

12

Mr. Liddle:

13

Ms. Sloan:

14

Mr. Liddle:

15

Ms. Sloan:

16

Mr. Liddle:

Yes.
And what is Division's policy?
To follow the Administrative Rule.
And-what is the Administrative Rule?
Currently, it is that for property

17

that is out on rent January 1st, it is taxable for

18

anything that is sitting on the floor that can be

19

either sold or rented, that that is exempt.
Ms. Sloan:

20

And, how

what is your experience

21

and how are the assessors expected to administer that

22

Rule?

23

Mr. Liddle:

By affidavit from declaration of the

24

tax payer.

Personal property is a self-assessing

25

affidavit throughout most of the State, so the tax

DEPOMAX REPORTING, LLC (801) 328-1188
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paye r is expecte d to complete that process.
Ms. Sloan:

So, pursuant to Tax Commission Rule,

then . if it is property held for rent or
it is taxable, even if it is rented?
Mr. Liddle:

(inaudible)

Is that correct?

Please restate that question.

are actually two parts to that

There

one part specifically

1

for Rent -to-Own and one part that deals more with
rent -to- rent.
Ms. Sloan:
primarily.

Well, we're dealing with Rent-to-Own

If you could again state what the policy

is or the ruling (inaudible).
Mr. Liddle:

If it's out on rent as of January

1st, on a Rent-t o-Own contract, it's taxable.

If it

is sitting on the floor and not out, it's exempt.
Ms. Sloan:

Are you familiar with what is called

a TC595 form?
Mr. Liddle:
Ms. Sloan:
Mr. Liddle:
Ms. Sloan:
Mr. Liddle:
Ms. Sloan:
Mr. Liddle:

Yes:
And how are those used?
They are not.
They are not used currently?
That's correct.
And what was their use initially?
It was a method

the TC595 came f rom
1

this pos ition.

I'm not sure where

it was in place when I came to

I know that it was little used by tax

DEPOMAX REPORTING, LLC (801) 328-1188
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1

payers or counties.

2

though, was also tax a portion of the property that

3

sat on the Rent-to-Own company's floor, to determine

4

what portion of that would be rented and what portion

5

would be sold outright.

6

inventory, even though it wasn't out on a Rent-to-Own

7

contract.

The

what TC595 tried to do,

And to also tax that

That's what the TC595 attempted to do.

8

Ms. Sloan:

9

Mr. Liddle:

Why is it not used?
It was done away with partly to

10

increase consistency of administration within the

11

counties.

12

method to enforce it, and after examining statute and

13

rule, we decided that probably the most consistent way

14

to administer the program would be to give the

15

taxpayer the benefit -of the doubt and assume that all

16

that property that was sitting on the showroom floor

17

would be sold outright.

18

knowing which of that would be rented and which would

19

be sold.

20
21

It wasn't being used, we had not real

Ms. Sloan:

Because we had no real way of

And so that would be exempt if it was

sitting to be sold outright?

22

Mr. Liddle:

23

Ms. Sloan:

Is that correct?

Correct.
Is there a difference between the IRS

24

class life and the IRS depreciation for income tax

25

purposes?

DEPOMAX REPORTING, LLC (801) 328-1188
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Mr. Liddle:
Ms. Sloan:
Mr. Liddle:

Yes •
What is the difference?
For income tax purposes, it is my

understanding, is that it accelerated depreciation to
a level allowed by the IRS.

The class life or what we

consider is economic life to be the useful productive
life of that equipment.
Ms. Sloan:

And that would be to the person that

was using it.
Mr. Liddle:
M s . Sloan:
Tax Division

Correct.
And you gave the or does the Property

(inaudible) Commission's

schedule

regarding the classification of property recognized by
IRS

(inaudible)?
Mr. Liddle:

We do to the degree possible?

have a simplified mass appraisal system.

We

We do not

where we combine various class-lifes into one
schedule.

We would have hundreds of schedules if we

tried to use all of the IRS class lifes.

But they

combined to a just simplified for the taxpayer and for
administrative purposes as much" as possible, while
still maintaining the integrity of the valuation
system.

So they don't match exactly, but we do rely

on the IRS class lifes.
Ms. Sloan:

Had you ever stated that the

DEPOMAX REPORTING, LLC (801) 328-1188
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1

in your view the Commission would change the class

2

life if the IRS did?

3

Mr. Liddle:

My recollection of that is that that

4

any time that the IRS changes a class life, we give

5

that considerable weight in making any changes to our

6

schedules.

7

would give it weight.

It would be the overriding factor, but we

8

Ms. Sloan:

9

changes it would not

Yes.

So, just the fact that they made
per se

result in an action

10

where you would change or the Commission would change

11

class life?

12

Mr. Liddle:

No.

Because, as I explained before,

13

there are various class lifes that fit within each of

14

our schedules.

15

they have.

16

M s . Sloan:

17

I guess

18

situation?

19

We have a simplified system over what

If the IRS changed the MACRS or ACRS,

(inaudible) class life, would that affect the

Mr. Liddle:

I'm not even really fully aware of

20

MACRS and ACRS.

21

that we do in the schedule building.

22

for income tax purposes and has no real reference to

23

the valuation procedure.

24

M s . Sloan:

25

Judge Phan:

We do not rely on that for anything

Thank you.
Mr. Thorpe?

DEPOMAX REPORTING, LLC (801) 328-1188

We consider that

